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The End of War as We Knew It?
Insurgency, counterinsurgency
and lessons from the forgotten
history of early terror networks
JOHN ARQUILLA
ABSTRACT The growing potency of networked organisations has manifested
itself over the past decade in the fresh energy evident among terrorists and
insurgents—most notably al-Qaida and Hezbollah. Networks have even shown
a capacity to wage war toe-to-toe against nation-states—with some success, as
can be seen in the outcome of the First Russo-Chechen War (1994 – 96). The
range of choices available to networks thus covers an entire spectrum of conflict,
posing the prospect of a significant blurring of the lines between insurgency,
terror and war. While history provides some useful examples to stimulate
strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight in so
many different ways—sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going to
require some innovative thinking to go along with more traditional introspection
about the relevant lessons of history.
Even an unconventional war can fall prey to conventional wisdom. In this
first great global struggle between terror networks and nation-states (the
‘global war on terror’, or GWOT), it has taken the form of two basic, widely
held assumptions: 1) that terror has just emerged as a full-blown form of
warfare in its own right; and 2) that this conflict is utterly unique. Both of
these assumptions are dismissive of history. Being guided—or rather mis-
guided—by them overlooks important lessons from earlier periods in the
long history of the use of terror as a military tactic and the history of
terrorism more generally. Although terrorism may only recently have come
to be viewed as a way of war being waged on a global scale, it has nonetheless
been resorted to frequently throughout the course of armed conflict.
Greater awareness of earlier instances of the systematic use of terror as a
tool of war will help us to identify some common principles that may prove
applicable to the present struggle with al-Qaida and related organisations.
And beyond the various historical cases that involved the significant use of
terrorism, it may also be possible to elucidate important similarities between
John Arquilla is in the Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 589 Dyer Road,
Monterey, CA 93943, USA. Email: jarquilla@nps.edu.
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp 369 – 386
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/07/020369–18 ! 2007 Third World Quarterly
DOI: 10.1080/01436590601153861 369
the tactical use of terror and what are regarded as more traditional forms of
warfare. To this end this article first examines terrorism as a general historical
phenomenon, and then focuses on some of the most salient cases of the use of
terror in war—including an important example from the American colonial
era. This is followed by a reconsideration of the main strategic precepts
thought to apply to warfare overall, with a focus on revisiting these ideas to
improve our understanding of the current war on terror. This leads to a
discussion of the implications of the apparently forgotten history of terrorism
for the strategy and doctrine that is central to what members of the US
government have now taken to calling ‘the Long War’.
Terrorism as a distinct form of war
Although there are literally dozens of differing definitions of terrorism—from
official government statements to scholarly formulations—all have in
common the notion of engaging in deliberate attacks on non-combatants
as a means of influencing the attitudes and actions of nations, leaders and
their mass publics. Viewed in this way, terror can be seen to have co-existed
with war since ancient times. The Romans in particular sought to ensure
loyalty—or at least quiescence—from those they conquered by means of the
exemplary use of lethal force against the innocent.
What the Romans called ‘punitive war’ was emulated by many throughout
the Middle Ages and on into the Renaissance. None was ever better at this
form of terror than the Mongols who, in order to encourage cities to
surrender rather than to stand a siege, made examples of those that did resist
by slaughtering virtually everyone within the walls if they had to be stormed.1
As Caleb Carr notes, this form of ‘state terror’ was a widespread prac-
tice until the ethical and practical lessons of the Enlightenment began
to be distilled in the 18th century and a more humane, limited sort of
‘progressive war’ emerged in the campaigns of Frederick the Great and his
contemporaries.2
The deliberate targeting of civilians by national or imperial military forces
lessened dramatically throughout the 19th century—with the notable
exception of the innumerable colonial wars of the period. But it was the
emergence of air power early in the 20th century that put state terror back in
business. From the start, theorists of air power spoke and wrote in terms of
terrifying enemy civilian populations into surrender without the prior need to
defeat their various armies and navies: an early notion of ‘shock and awe’, if
you will. Italian General Giulio Douhet, one of the first apostles of air power,
even went so far as to call for bombardment of hostile populations with
chemical weapons—a recommendation that Mussolini would eagerly take up
in his war on Ethiopia in the mid-1930s.3
While nobody at the time emulated Mussolini’s example by employing
poison gas in aerial attacks, World War II would see air power applied
relentlessly against civilians, the deliberate fire bombings of Hamburg,
Dresden and Tokyo being the prime examples. Then of course there were the
nuclear strikes against the population centres of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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In all these cases save for Hamburg, the outcome of the war was already
completely determined by the time of the attack, yet terror methods were
used anyway.
For all these applications of state terror, there is scant evidence that terror
has actually worked as a strategy. Carr argues that from ancient Rome to the
modern world it never worked.4 However, as I see it, the Mongols applied
their particular brand of terror quite effectively, encouraging their victims to
surrender their cities without fighting. But the Mongols may be an exception
to the rule. As to the dozens of strategic bombing campaigns mounted over
the past century, it is hard to find any that have worked as intended—from
the Battle of Britain in 1940 to the bombing of Baghdad in 2003. On this
point, Robert Pape’s thoughtful examination of air power is very much in
sync with Carr’s analysis.5
Terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors
It is important to note at this point that even many centuries ago terrorism
was not the sole prerogative of the state—although states and empires have
indeed been the predominant practitioners throughout most of history. An
important exception arose in the late Middle Ages, when a bitter terror war
erupted and was waged for centuries in the Mediterranean between Christian
corsairs led by the Knights of Malta and the Muslim ‘pirates’ of Barbary.
The Christians raided, pillaged and murdered with a will along the coasts of
North Africa, while the Muslims struck at the main trade routes, islands and
some ports on the European side of the sea. On both sides combatants were
goaded into action by government or religious leaders, but in this centuries-
long conflict virtually none of their attacks was accompanied by officially
constituted military forces.6
This protracted struggle went on as long as it did because neither side had
the will to muster enough strength to deliver a knockout blow. Muslim
raiders were small, highly mobile and widely distributed, greatly complicating
any effort to eradicate them. On the Christian side the corsairs did operate
from a central hub—the island fortress of Malta—and an Ottoman sultan
eventually tried to conquer the island in the mid-16th century. But his 40 000-
man expeditionary force failed in the face of one of the most heroic defences
in all history, led by just a few thousand Knights of St John.7 The long
Mediterranean terror war was finally terminated shortly after the Napoleonic
wars, when the Concert of Europe (the European Community of that time)
encouraged France to invade and to begin colonising the North African
territories where the Barbary pirates had been based.
Another protracted terror war was launched in the first half of the 18th
century in North America, when France encouraged native American tribes
to murder any English settlers who strayed too far west from their
settlements on the Atlantic seaboard. This awful campaign had a profound
religious element, as the tribes most closely associated with these brutal
attacks on the frontier were converts to Catholicism—and they were often led
in the field by fanatical Jesuit priests.8 Beyond church support for this brand
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of terror, it was authorised by the kings of France, and practised right up
until the final conquest of Canada by British and colonial American forces in
1760.
From a military perspective this French-inspired terror campaign had
significant strategic and tactical merits. Such attacks allowed the French to
make up for their serious numerical inferiority in North America by for-
cing English colonists to focus on the defence of settlements all along
the frontier.9 Also, their ability to fight in small bands and to traverse forest
terrain swiftly and secretly allowed them to strike by surprise repeatedly.
In the end, however, these terrorist tactics were defeated by both in-
novative military units and tactics, and by the increased level of effort that
outrage at such barbarism catalysed. Thus the colonists first developed
counter-terror forces capable of ‘ranging’ the frontier—the genesis of the
American special forces tradition—both to defend the innocent and to track
and then retaliate against the attackers. Beyond this nimble new approach to
field operations, the sheer scale of the atrocities committed by the Indians,
which reached their peak in the Fort William Hentry massacre, finally drove
colonists to respond decisively. Impelled by accounts of these horrific events,
the settlers spared no expense in raising the size of forces necessary both to
deal with the terrorist threat and soon thereafter to help British regular forces
drive the French from North America itself.
The fall of the French empire in North America hardly brought about an
end to the use of terror as a form of warfare, however. For during the
Revolutionary War, both insurgents and loyalist Tories—each side amount-
ing to about a third of the general populace—regularly struck at each other in
the most brutal ways. Women and children were sometimes the targets of
such terror, and both sides had much of which to be ashamed. British
military forces, frustrated by their general inability to come to grips with hit-
and-run raiders—particularly in the South—sometimes encouraged or
directly joined in these depredations. Despite their devotion to such practices,
neither side gained much from engaging in acts of terrorism—although
this aspect of the war should be distinguished from the performance of
Revolutionary guerrilla leaders, who focused on attacking British forces and
did achieve quite a bit in the course of their campaigns.10
In the 19th century perhaps the best-known examples of pure terror
warfare conducted by non-state actors occurred in the area of the American
‘border states’ in the years before and during the Civil War. There, especially
in Kansas and Missouri, factions arose either in favour of or opposed
to slavery; their political struggles for control quickly spawned terror.11 As
was the case with the American Revolution, these Civil War-era atrocities did
very little to affect the outcome of the larger conflict. But they did sow seeds
of discontent and foster a climate of retribution that poisoned much of the
post-war atmosphere.
This edgy, blurry relationship between insurgency and terrorism persisted
throughout the century after the American Civil War. In China, for example,
the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 that aimed to evict foreign powers seen as
occupying and exploiting the Middle Kingdom featured attacks on both
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Western militaries and the civilians who were in China alongside them. The
Boxers were put down effectively. But this did not prevent them from being
emulated by other movements trying to throw off colonial control. However,
the difference that emerged in several other uprisings in this period was in the
refinement of a guerrilla warfare doctrine that for the most part repudiated
terror as a preferred means of expelling foreign occupiers.12
This is hardly to suggest that the guerrilla wars of the 20th century were
clean affairs; but it does imply that insurgents’ primary targets were often
occupying militaries and their related governmental representatives. How-
ever, the several exceptions to this rule, where terror crept back in to the
calculus of rebellion, are most instructive. For example, the Mau Mau
insurgency in Kenya during the 1950s employed terror tactics as a primary
means of pursuing its aim of expelling British forces and colonists. Beyond
targeting European settlers, the Mau Mau also assassinated fellow Kenyans
seen as co-operating with colonial rule.13
Initially the British tried to defeat the insurgents with air raids and
‘sweeps’ by conventional ground forces. Neither of these methods had much
effect on the distributed, loosely networked bands of Mau Mau fighters.
Eventually, however, the British seized upon one officer’s notion of creating
their own small bands of ‘pseudo-gangs’ drawn from among detainees. The
pseudo-gangsters, initially no more than 50 divided into seven teams, were
sent out in the field to help locate Mau Mau groups and camps, guiding
British strike forces to them. This ruse de guerre proved wildly successful,
and was largely the reason that the Mau Mau were soon put out of
business.14
Perhaps the most skilful blending of insurgency and terror can be found in
the case of the Vietnamese communists’ 30-year struggle to expel first French
and then US forces that blocked their path to power. Throughout the three
decades of this conflict the insurgents alternated between conventional
and unconventional military tactics, and between periods of terror bombings
in cities and assassinations of colonial-friendly headmen in rural areas.
Thus, pure guerrilla warfare occasionally gave way to major conventional
offensives: Dienbienphu (1954); Tet (1968); Easter (1972) and a final country-
wide assault (1975). And terror tactics, while almost always used to
some extent, tended to rise in frequency to support ongoing conventional
offensives.15
Another example of a ‘Vietnammodel’ can be discerned in the insurgency in
El Salvador during the 1980s, where field operations of the FMLN rebels were
supported by terror strikes in cities, attacks against public infrastructure, and
campaigns of assassination against rural mayors and other government
officials. The most interesting aspect of the Salvadoran case is that, contrary
to counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, in this instance the insurgents/
terrorists were kept from achieving their war aims. Not by large American
ground forces and bombing, but by a small advisory mission working to
improve the Salvadoran military and to exploit the excesses of the FMLN in
ways that reduced popular support for the rebellion. In the end the insurgents
were blocked militarily and their terrorist acts boomeranged on them.
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When the Salvadoran government put out peace feelers to the FMLN,
successful negotiations were soon concluded.16
But this wasn’t the only model out there. An alternative was necessary for
those who could not ever hope to confront their betters in a traditional way.
So, while the Vietnamese communists were perfecting their mixture of
conventional, irregular and terrorist tactics, there were others on the rise
whose own doctrines eschewed classical military operations—which even
Mao Zedong thought were necessary at the ‘culminating point’ of a cam-
paign to achieve a decisive victory.17 Instead, these other insurgents sought to
craft a different way to win simply by wearing down the will of their opp-
onents through a mix of guerrilla warfare and acts of terror.
The most salient example of this dual guerrilla/terrorist model is provided by
the Algerian war for independence from 1954 to 1962. The FLN waged a skilful
guerrilla campaign for several years against the French military. They also
struck repeatedly using terror against Algerians who sympathised with their
colonial overlords, and against French settlers—the so-called pieds noirs. In the
event the counter-insurgent effort succeeded in defeating both the guerrilla cells
and their terrorist nodes—but only by means of employing the most brutal
interrogation methods. Ultimately the French won their campaign on the
ground, but lost the larger ‘battle of the story’, at home and in the eyes of the
world community, and soon granted the Algerians their independence.18
There was yet a third fundamental approach to insurgency that emerged in
the 20th century, one that relied almost exclusively on terror tactics.19 The
archetypal case of this mode of conflict was the campaign by Israeli
nationalists to create an independent state of Israel that would serve as a
haven for Jews in the wake of World War II. These insurgents had no field
army, and had very little hope even of being able to wage guerrilla warfare
against the British, who still maintained a mandate over Palestine. So the
insurgents relied for the most part upon acts of terror. In this instance,
however, it was terror with a conscience, featuring strict rules of warning and
engagement designed to minimise casualties among the innocent. The
approach apparently worked, convincing the British that Palestine had
fallen victim to what Maurice Tugwell calls the ‘asset-to-liability shift’.20
It was this third model of insurgency that ushered in the ‘modern age of
terror’, which began in the late 1960s. But, in this era, those who have chosen
to emulate the Israeli model have seldom been as thoughtful about providing
warning or employing violence in discriminate ways.
The ‘modern era’ of terrorism
It is ironic that the terror-based mode of insurgency pioneered by early Israeli
nationalists should be emulated and expanded upon by radical Muslims
seeking a Palestinian state, whose principal target over the past three-and-a-
half decades has been Israel itself. Aside from whatever inspiration they may
have received from the success of the ‘Israeli model’ of insurgency, it had at
this point grown clear, from the outcomes of the Six Day War (1967) and the
Yom Kippur War (1973) that Israel could not be defeated militarily. Even the
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guerrilla War of Attrition (1969 – 70) had proved a failure. So the terror
option was probably the only way to continue the struggle with any hope of
achieving ultimate success.
The Muslim terror war that raged against Israel—and sometimes against
the USA and others sympathetic to the Israeli cause—differed on a very basic
level from the earlier fight against the British over Palestine. In the former
case Muslim terrorists undertook far more indiscriminately violent actions
that often tended to alienate even those most sympathetic to the cause of the
dispossessed Palestinians. By the mid-1980s it was clear that a terror strategy
alone would not work and so in 1987 the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) inspired a civil insurrection, an intifada, designed to recoup public
sympathy even as it discomfited the Israelis. After six years of this, enough
progress in the court of global public opinion had been made to impel the
Israelis to sign the Oslo Peace Accords. Seven years later, in 2000, a new
intifada erupted that continues today, and which is accompanied by
continual acts of terror, as well as negotiations.
The Palestinians have not been alone in pursuing a largely terror-based
form of insurgency. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, con-
ducted a similar type of campaign starting in the late 1960s, when the
‘troubles’ that bedevilled British rule in Northern Ireland began.21 In their
case, however, the IRA were generally able to limit the amount of opprobrium
heaped upon them by trying, to the extent possible, to strike primarily at
‘military targets’. This was a rule of engagement often honoured only in the
breach; and even some strikes against British soldiers have been seen as
inappropriate (eg targeting and killing army band members). Overall many
problems arose for the IRA as a result both of its inability to do much military
harm and of the negative public reaction to its acts of terror against innocent
noncombatants. In the face of a clearly failing terror campaign, the IRA has
for the past decade sought a negotiated solution, its only credible hope for
achieving an eventual political success.
By 1993, with the end of the first Palestinian intifada and the start of a
serious shift in the IRA towards negotiation, it seemed clear that the modern
age of terror might end well. The USSR, which seemed to have encouraged
some radical groups during the Cold War, had dissolved and the total
numbers of terrorist acts committed world-wide each year was dropping—yet
another very positive development. But by 1994 hopes for an end to terror
would be dashed, for it was in that year that the first Russo-Chechen war
broke out. During the course of this conflict (1994 – 96), Chechen insurgents
revitalised and perhaps even transformed the whole business of irregular
warfare, as their small bands of fighters drove Russian forces out of the
country in pitched battles.22 Beyond the battlefield the Chechens engaged in
several spectacular but not particularly bloody terrorist attacks (eg seizure of
a Black Sea ferry; hijackings of passenger planes) that were designed to call
attention to and gain sympathy for their cause.
The truce that ended the first war with a Chechen victory in 1996 soon
showed signs of fraying around the edges, and was completely broken less
than four years later. In the wake of several terrorist attacks in Daghestan
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and a series of apartment-building bombings in Russia—in which both
forensic evidence and intelligence reports implicated the Chechens—the
Russian government felt the need to reconquer Chechnya. In the years since
the conflict resumed, army and spetsnaz forces have reoccupied the country
and shown their ability to prevail in head-to-head confrontations with
Chechen insurgents. Thus there have been few large pitched battles, and not
even very much guerrilla warfare. Instead, the Chechens have shown an
increasingly deadly sophistication as terrorists. They have, among other
things, seized opera houses and schools, and put suicide bombers on two
passenger flights, bringing both down. In short, there appears to be no end in
sight to the terror war they have unleashed upon the Russians.23
Some Chechen fighters first went into action against the Russians when
the latter were occupying Afghanistan during the 1980s. But many more
travelled there after the Russians left, joining in the ongoing civil wars and
eventually linking up with the emerging al-Qaida network. Indeed, the
Chechens would become some of the premier fighters in Osama bin Laden’s
organisation during the 1990s. It may even be that, in the years after the first
Russo-Chechen war, the growing penchant for engaging in terrorist acts
throughout Russia was fomented by those Chechens who had become even
more radicalised through their exposure to and association with al-Qaida.
Of course bin Laden’s network was built up of far more than Chechens, as
thousands of aspiring mujahideen, the products of a global recruiting pool,
went to train in Afghanistan. There they were taught to take the fight to
‘apostate’ rulers ofMuslim countries—and to the ‘far enemy’, the USA, which
cast a huge shadow across the Islamic world. But these and other details of the
al-Qaida war will be considered in the next section. For now, it should suffice
to observe that the notion of terror having just emerged as a way of war in its
own right must be sharply amended in light of the historical record. Seen in
this light, al-Qaida reflects an interesting mix of older, enduring terrorist
traits, and the more modern shift towards a focus on terror as a form of
strategic attack, rather than simply as a form of guerrilla or insurgent warfare.
Are the terror war’s characteristics unique?
From the outset of the GWOT the point has been made repeatedly that it is an
entirely new kind of war. From this point of view it will not end in a
‘surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS Missouri’. Instead, it will
probably go on for decades (hence the recent invocation of the Long War by
the Bush administration). Yet the war waged against al-Qaida, its affiliates
and its real or imagined state sponsors, has often as not looked like previous
wars. To be sure, a remarkable mix of small teams of special forces, closely
interconnected with attack aircraft, brought about the fall of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan in what might be called a ‘war to change all wars’ late
in 2001. But then there was also ‘shock and awe’ strategic bombing and a
march up Mesopotamia in Iraq during the US invasion in 2003, both highly
redolent of traditional warfare. And in each case the ruling logic was that a
terror network could be defeated by attacking nation-states. How can this
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traditional focus persist, if the terror war differs so radically from what has
come before?
Perhaps the answer is that, for all its strange newness, the current conflict
nevertheless has many features in common with earlier wars. The key
question then becomes: ‘What strands of strategic thought might improve
our ability to understand the terror war?’ With this in mind, I consider in this
section a few broad concepts about this conflict that highlight its similarities
with what has come before—while noting the key differences as well—and
which may provide us with some intellectual handholds as we begin to
grapple with the way ahead.
It may be that the single most important similarity between terrorism and
traditional warfare is in its inherently strategic nature. That is, terror, though
waged by small hit squads, may have much more in common with strategic
bombardment than with small-unit tactics. Indeed, the Hezbollah terrorist
organisation’s operations in the war with Israel during the summer of 2006
consisted, for the most part, of a missile bombardment of civilian targets.
Whether it is air or missile strikes, or terrorist attacks by small groups of
zealots, all feature the ability to strike directly at an adversary’s non-
combatant population without the prior need to defeat its armed forces in the
field. Throughout military history, this condition was achievable only rarely
(eg the corsairs of Barbary and Malta in the middle ages; native tribes raiding
the American frontier in the 18th century). But the rise of air power a century
ago made engaging in strategic warfare from the outset of any conflict a
reasonable proposition. HGWells portrayed it first, perhaps best, in The War
in the Air (1908), a chilling tale of terror from the sky whose main points were
embraced and repeated again and again by major military theorists of air
power in the ensuing decades.
Both aerial bombing and terror strikes are designed, in theory, to work by
undermining the will of enemy civilians to support their governments’
continued prosecution of a given war. The underlying construct is that the
ongoing threat of random death—from the sky or elsewhere—will be more
than a civil society can bear. Psychology aside, both forms of war also seek to
impose severe and growing economic costs on their targets. Both also feature
a great degree of flexibility, in terms of just who may be targeted. Certainly
more suppleness than one could hope to find in the other forms of military
power. A most important similarity, however, may be a point derived from
reflection on the histories of air power and terror: neither has ‘worked’ with
any kind of regularity. In the case of air power, a century of bombardment
campaigns yields very few examples of actual successes.24 The brief survey
undertaken earlier in this article suggests that terrorism has proven a bit
more successful, but only at the margins. Neither has been a showstopper, in
part because the fundamental human response to such attacks has always
been a mix of rage and resolve—not psychological collapse.25
There are also differences between air power and terror that must be
considered. The most obvious is that aerial bombing, while inherently more
destructive than terror, may be both psychologically and economically less
disruptive. During World War II about 600 000 German civilians were killed
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in the course of over three years of sustained allied bombardment. But the
industrial production of the Third Reich continued to rise, and the will of
the German people was never broken. By way of contrast, the 9/11 attacks on
the USA were over in minutes, destroyed just a few buildings and killed only a
few thousand people. Yet they forever changed the way Americans would
look at the world—and caused several hundreds of billions of dollars of econo-
mic damage, perhaps as much as $1 trillion, according to some estimates.
Another key difference between the two forms of strategic warfare has to
do with what might be called ‘entry costs’. Developing a potent air attack
capability entails huge expenditures and requires great technological prowess.
Terror does not, as it can be mounted on a shoestring budget. Next there is
the offence – defence balance to consider. The 1930s-era British statesman
Stanley Baldwin asserted that ‘the bomber will always get through’, yet it was
clear even back then that a fleet of bombers had to rely, at least to some
extent, on supporting forces able to clear the air ways for them. Missile
bombardment, of course, avoids this problem, as Hezbollah has recently
proved, but may eventually have to contemplate some form of interception
threat also. As far as Baldwin’s comment is concerned, it should perhaps be
updated to incorporate the notion that ‘the terrorist will always get through’.
But here too we should qualify this assertion, given the huge efforts being
taken to provide at least some homeland defences against terrorist attack
(something which has precipitated considerable debate as to the actual
substance of the threat to US territory).26
The third major difference between traditional strategic bombardment and
terror has to do with weapons of mass destruction. In the 60þ years of the
nuclear age, the USA remains the only country ever to have attacked using
nuclear weapons, right at the outset of the era in 1945. The remarkable record
of forbearance ever since may be attributed in part to normative inhibitions
about using such weapons against an opponent not similarly armed (for
example, it would have been unthinkable for Britain to have responded to the
Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands with nuclear weapons).
And in the case of enemies who both possess such weapons, mutual deterrence
is thought to be quite robust (as in the case of the Soviet –US cold war
rivalry). But if a terror network were to obtain even a few nuclear weapons, or
a biological warfare capability, then neither normative inhibitions nor mutual
deterrence would be likely to obtain. Terrorists would instead have strong
incentives to use or threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
because they would enjoy enormous coercive bargaining power and almost
surely would not have to worry about having a ‘homeland’ of their own that
could be threatened with nuclear retaliation. In short, if there is ever to be a
‘nuclear Napoleon’, he will more probably than not be a terrorist.
The future of terror
As can be seen from the discussion of ‘strategic attack’, terror is not
inherently unique as a mode of conflict—certainly not at the most conceptual
level. And there are at least three other elements that have long been
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important in more traditional wars, and which continue to feature
prominently in this one as well. They all tend to benefit al-Qaida and its
allies more than those who struggle against the terror networks. This is a
troubling point that merits our attention. The three other concepts worth
reflecting upon are briefly discussed below.
Surprise attack
One of the canonical principles of war affirms the power of surprise and
most, if not all, wars reflect some use of it. Surprise can be used in a strategic
way, often at the outset of a war. The Japanese assaults on Russian forces at
Port Arthur in 1903 and on US forces at Pearl Harbor in 1941 are classic
cases of strategic surprise. At the tactical level surprise can be used to fool an
adversary about the specific place or time of an attack. In the latter phases of
World War I, for example, commanders regularly rejected long preparatory
bombardments in favour of launching assaults after just a few minutes of
shelling, so as to preserve surprise. Half a century later, in the Vietnam War,
heliborne assaults would routinely feature much ‘touch-and-go’ feinting that
strove to divert enemy troops from massing at the actual landing zone
chosen. Such is surprise at the tactical level in traditional warfare.
For al-Qaida, surprise comes with relative ease, as it employs very small
units of manoeuvre that nevertheless have quite substantial destructive and
disruptive power: the smaller the force, the easier to conceal movement and
intent. And so, even though we are in the sixth year of the GWOT or the Long
War, our adversaries can rely on retaining the ability to strike with surprise.
We well know that they will be coming, but we seldom have clear notions
about where or when the next strike will occur. Witness the major strike at
Bali in 2002, the waves of smaller attacks across a swath of the Muslim world
in 2003, followed by another major attack in Madrid in 2004 and others in
London in 2005. A happy exception to all this was the British pre-emption of
a major terrorist attack in the summer of 2006 that aimed to down 10
airliners over the Atlantic Ocean. But this sort of coup has remained rare.
Beyond strategic and tactical surprise, however, al-Qaida has clearly also
thought about what might be called ‘doctrinal surprise’—the best example of
which was the notion of turning airliners into guided missiles. Terrorists are
no doubt continuing to think of other novel modes of attack.
For our part, strategic surprise is difficult to maintain in an open, media-
driven democratic system where almost all our major war moves must be
debated publicly—occasionally acrimoniously and often endlessly. Some-
times even tactical surprise is fatally compromised, as in the second battle of
Fallujah in late 2004, before which the city’s residents were given some weeks’
warning of the impending assault by the US marines so that they could
evacuate. This guaranteed that most of the foreign fighters being sought
would also have time to flee. In the realm of doctrinal surprise, however, the
counter-terror coalition has had its innings too, as the innovative use of air
power and special operations forces in Afghanistan in the closing months of
2001 did appear to have taken the Taliban and al-Qaida well off balance,
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quickly toppling them from power there. Even so, they have rebounded, and
continue to mount guerrilla and terrorist attacks from their new haven in
Waziristan (see Rothstein, ‘Less is more’ in this issue).
Organizational structure
Throughout the long history of conflict, there has been an ongoing action –
reaction process underway in the organisational realm. It has revolved for the
most part around the fundamental tendency of armed forces to maximise
their ability to strike with the greatest mass possible. The Greek phalanx, for
example, was a concentration of heavy infantry whose shock power was great
enough to defeat the numerically far larger but less cohesive forces of the
Persian Empire and others. But eventually the phalanx was challenged, and
mastered, by the Roman legionary formation, which consisted of interlock-
ing small units (ie the maniples, or ‘handfuls’ of infantry). Again and again
this theme would re-emerge over the centuries, right up into modern times.
For example, the massed battalions of the 16th century Spanish army
would be overtaken in the 17th century by the small, flexible Swedish
formations pioneered by Gustavus Adolphus that mixed musketeers and
pikemen. In the 18th and 19th centuries regular forces of most leading states
would have to learn ‘bush fighting’ formations and tactics in order to cope
with irregular insurgent groups. But by the 20th century, mass would re-
assert itself. Even so, the huge army corps-sized units of World War I were
soon bloodily crushed by heavy, rapid and accurate firepower. It would take
the creation of very small teams of ‘storm troops’ pioneering infiltration
tactics to eventually restore the balance on the battlefield—an innovation
that helped lead to the rise of modern manoeuvre warfare doctrine.27 Even
guerrilla warfare itself can be seen as a response by the ‘small and the many’
to the power of the ‘few and the large’.
So it is in this terror war, where traditional military power is being
challenged once again by greatly empowered small units of dedicated
enemies. And, with the sole exception of the first few months of the special-
forces-led campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, it has proven difficult for the US
military to embrace fully the notion of focusing organisational redesign
around the notion of a force comprised of the small and the many. In part,
resistance to transformational change of this type grows from existing
organisational inertia; but the concern has also been expressed that the
military must remain ready to fight a large conventional war.28 To this
concern I would say that a military rebuilt around nimble, networked small
units supported by leading-edge bombardment and stand-off attack systems
would defeat an enemy which massed its forces in the open more easily than
an adversary that kept its fighters dispersed and generally in hiding.
Intelligence gathering
The last major concept from traditional warfare that I believe is especially
relevant to terrorism pertains to the problem of ‘knowing’. Many, if not
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most, battles and wars have been decided in favour of the side that knew
more about its enemy’s dispositions and intentions. In biblical times the
Midianites would surely not have been defeated had they known how weak
the force that Gideon led against them was. Later on the Byzantines created
an extensive defence-in-depth system for their empire, comprised of a
network of small outposts whose principal job was to relay information
about Muslim and other raiders to the empire’s heavy cavalry forces. These
would quickly ride to the threatened areas and destroy or drive off the
attackers. This sort of sensory network, though relying on alarm riders and
signals rather than telephone and radio relays, is organisationally the same
structure adopted by Britain’s Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain
in 1940. Even though a strand of strategic thought takes the position that
intelligence gathering may have less impact on outcomes of wars than we
might think,29 the abundance of examples from all periods of history—and
virtually all conflicts—suggests otherwise.
The principal intelligence gathering challenges in the current conflict stem
from the ‘hiders – finders dynamic’ that characterises it. The terrorists simply
cannot stand much open fighting, and must hide: not only their fighters, but
also their combat support, command, logistical and other functions. Even in
a ‘virtual haven’ like Waziristan, al-Qaida operates under continuing
pressure to remain as hidden as possible if it hopes to maintain any links
to the network at large. So, in the wake of the loss of its Afghan ‘hub’, al-
Qaida has become far more loose-jointed than ever in order to survive the
relentless search to rip apart its various cells and nodes around the world.
The challenge for those fighting the terrorists is to identify the proper means
for improving their ‘finding’ capabilities.
The dominant American intelligence gathering strategy to date has been to
rely on a traditional, technology-heavy approach to the problem of locating
the enemy. Thus, the existing suite of satellites and other watching and
listening systems continues to be relied upon primarily. Financial tracking
tools are being redirected to go beyond the detection of criminal activity to
search out the spoor of terrorists. To the extent to which ‘softer’ means of
intelligence gathering have been employed, the effort has been focused upon
the use—and sometimes the abuse—of detainees. The earlier, pre-industrial
history of intelligence gathering in wartime features many methods that
might prove useful to attempts to grow a greater non-technological capacity
for intelligence gathering. With detainees, for example, I refer back to the
earlier example of the British recruitment of some to serve in counter-terror
‘pseudo-gangs’. Surely, whether they are drawn from detainees or not,
infiltrators can be of great service in a war like this one. A further example
from history about how to locate a distributed terror network can be seen in
the way the Mongols destroyed the Cult of the Assassins. Although these
terrorists operated from over 100 locations across south and central Asia, the
Mongols succeeded in capturing their ideological leader and using him to
smoke out the others.30 Some variant of this approach (eg deliberately going
after much lower-level leaders to roll up cells in various regions) should
perhaps be considered.
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There are no doubt other concepts from the history of conflict that will
prove useful in improving our understanding of the GWOT or the Long War.
In this section I have selected three that seem to bear particular relevance to
the problems we confront, and which suggest strongly that this conflict is
not unique in the annals of war. A search for other relevant concepts
would surely produce more similarities; but these three are a good place to
start and give us much to think about. The notion of strategic attack, for
example, should encourage us to consider where al-Qaeda might take the
war in its next phase. The terror networks’ inherent advantages in mount-
ing surprise attacks should prompt an examination of countermeasures.
And the impediments to organisational redesign and to improved intelli-
gence gathering must also come under scrutiny. In the final section of this
paper, I suggest a few initiatives that might take us forward in each of these
areas.
Lessons from history and a call for an ‘information strategy’
In answering the two questions that have guided this article—which are about
the ‘newness’ of terror as a form of war and its distinctness from what has
come before as a mode of conflict—I have found ready evidence suggesting
that both can be answered in the negative. Terror has been a part of war for a
long time, and many centuries ago began to slip the bonds of the national and/
or imperial ‘monopolies’ on its practice. Beyond this sense of its lasting
presence in history, there are also abundant signs of terror’s conceptual
similarity with war as we have generally conceived it for millennia.
What then are we to make of such findings? For it is not enough simply to
say that terror has been around for a long time and that it has many features
in common with traditional warfare. It is necessary next to dive deeper into
the insights that history provides us; and to recalibrate our strategy, or at
least to reflect about our choices in a more informed way. For example, from
the body of historical evidence analysed earlier in this paper we should be
prompted to ask some further questions, such as: why has terrorism generally
failed as a mode of war? Can the risk of surprise attack ever be mitigated?
What are the organisational requirements for fighting networks? How can
the right sort of intelligence be systematically gathered?
As one who has spent much of his time over the past decade-and-a-half
thinking about matters related to ‘information strategy’, I am increasingly
inclined to see answers to each of these questions coming from the
informational domain. With regard to the low ‘success rate’ of terror,31 it
seems clear that revulsion at and resistance to acts of barbarism against
innocent civilians have been the common responses throughout history.
France, for example, gained a tactical edge in the Seven Years’ War in North
America by its fomenting of terror on the frontier; but it suffered a huge
strategic loss because these atrocities mobilised and unified its enemies to an
unprecedented degree. In more modern times the German bombing of
Warsaw, Rotterdam and then various English cities in the early phases of
World War II simply helped to fortify the will to resist of those under attack
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and those watching from afar—who would come together eventually to
defeat Nazism.
Similarly al-Qaeda’s attacks on the USA in 2001 immediately galvanised a
global alliance against terrorism. That this unity was soon frayed by the
controversial invasion of Iraq in March 2003 does not undermine the basic
point that terrorism almost always elicits a negative reaction—from its
targets and from those who merely observe such acts. The venture in Iraq
does, however, make abundantly clear that the USA is also vulnerable to
charges of wrongly bringing war to the innocent. The thousands of dead Iraqi
civilians—victims of ‘shock and awe’—and numerous images of the
maltreatment of detainees later discharged from custody have undermined
the clarity of purpose that so empowered the first phase of our counter-attack
on terror. The lesson here is that even those waging a just war remain
obligated to wage it in a just manner.32
And so concepts of field operations should be revised to reflect this key
aspect of information warfare: the ‘battle of the story’. It is not enough to try
to compartmentalise a ‘war of ideas’ around radio and television stations that
are under friendly ownership and control. Opinions, ideas, reactions, all are
more profoundly affected by what is being done militarily than by what is
said. With this in mind, it is high time to develop a willingness to amend and
adjust military strategies based on concerns raised by insights from
information strategy. If one can make this leap, then perhaps there will be
less outcry against one’s own actions, and a return of focus to much more
appropriate objects of outrage: the terrorists themselves.
My thoughts about the three other questions also tend towards finding
answers that derive from the information domain, and which emphasise the
crosscutting nature of these key issue areas. When it comes to the problem of
surprise attack, for example, an information-strategy-related answer is that
only organisational redesign along networked lines will vastly improve the
ability to manage the information that comes into the system. Optimising the
use of one’s own data is seldom explicitly addressed, however. Even by those
in charge of ‘information operations’ (IO), a point made evident by the
absence of any mention of the concept of information management from the
Pentagon’s so-called ‘IO roadmap’. And while reorganisation of US
intelligence-gathering entities was called for by the 9/11 Commission—and
swiftly enacted by the executive and legislative branches of the US
government—the kind of changes effected had very little to do with networks
and far more to do with creating a vision of ever greater central control. If it
is true that ‘it takes a network to fight a network’, then there is still a very
long way to go.33
So far the three types of information operations initiatives that I have
sketched out in response to key terror war challenges can all be undertaken
without much reference to the actions of the enemy. Whatever al-Qaida does,
its opponents can remain in full control over their own behaviour towards
non-combatants. This is also true with regard to the process of organisational
change, whether there is clear freedom to choose to build either new networks
or traditional hierarchies, or something in between with which to manage
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information and intelligence. But there is at least one aspect of the
information domain that requires a great deal of interaction with the enemy:
the realm of psychological operations and deception. Unfortunately, both of
these ‘speciality items’ on the IO menu have tended to focus on targeting
traditional militaries rather than terror networks. This must change, as these
are just the sorts of means that can be employed ethically and effectively in
pursuit of the war aims of the counter-terror coalition.
One need only look back to the deceptions employed against Abu Nidal in
the 1980s—which convinced him that he had been betrayed by his own
operatives and led to the destruction of his network a generation ago—to see
that there are other ways to cripple al-Qaida.34 And even if there is neither
the willingness nor the ability to mount an actual psychological offensive
against Osama bin Laden and his allies, there should at least be some
thinking along the lines of deceiving the terrorists. They should all be made
to worry that those who hunt them actually are in the process of penetrating
their networks and turning trusted agents away from the cause. Deceptive
‘stings’ can often work as well as some direct actions in the field.
Conclusion: the end of war as we knew it?
It seems clear to all that the Long War cannot be won by strictly military
means. Even if the enemies of the terrorists ‘transform’ their field forces to
improve the effectiveness of the hider – finder campaign—and this is worth
doing—decisive victory will only come when potential terrorist recruits are
dissuaded from joining the cause, and persuaded that their own sacrifices are
likely to be for naught. If there is to be any hope for such a result, it lies in
cultivating a deeper understanding of the role of information strategy in this
conflict, and of its being inextricably intertwined with the military actions
being taken. Indeed, it may be that, in terms of the Long War thus far, and in
what is likely to come, ideas and beliefs have, in important ways, begun to
trump traditional warfighting. In this respect, then, war as we have known it
may indeed have come to an end.
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